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Abstract— Conventional entity authentication is not enough to
build a secure pervasive computing environment. Being sure that
you are talking to the expected entity does not guarantee it is
going to do what you expect him to do, and only that. This paper
introduces a concept of “trustworthy authentication” in pervasive
computing which is defined as entity authentication accompanied by
an assurance of trustworthy behaviour of the authenticated entity.
It discusses how to provide trustworthy authentication in pervasive
computing using the example of a roaming customer wishing
to print his email on a public printer. A two-level hierarchical
trustworthy authentication scheme is proposed where local and
higher-level authorization servers issue trustworthiness certificates
after receiving trustworthiness records from the printer, signed by
its users. The proposed scheme may be generalized for trustworthy
authentication of security devices such as firewalls.
I. INTRODUCTION
Pervasive (or ubiquitous) computing presents a world with
various kinds of digital devices embedded with certain “intel-
ligence”, connected with one another in an unobtrusive way,
despite the roaming of some devices with wireless transmission
capacities. The normal means of authentication have to be re-
examined when applied to the environment of pervasive comput-
ing. Pioneering work has been made on solving the problem of
lacking a centralized online authentication server to issue tickets
as in Kerberos or certificates as in public key infrastructure
(PKI), e.g., the “resurrecting ducking” [4], [5]. However, Creese
et al. argue that the current notions of entity authentication are
unsuitable for the pervasive domain [3]. Taking the example of
a user wishing to print his email on a unknown public wireless
printer, the security assurances achieved by entity authentication
that the user is likely to want are:
  The confidential data of the email only goes from the user’s
PDA to the specific printer chosen by the user, and no other.
  The confidential data is treated by the printer in a “trustwor-
thy” way. Trustworthy here means that the printer ensures
that no other party has access to the data while it is resident
on the printer and that the printer itself will not use the data
in a malicious way (e.g., only pretending to delete the data
after finishing printing).
The first requirement might be provided by the conventional
concept of entity authentication after being specially tailored for
the features of pervasive computing. The second requirement is
Trustworthy Authentication 
of a Printer to a User
(1) This printer 
authenticates itself to be the 
one that the user chooses 
(2) The user believes that this 
printer will behave 
trustworthily
Fig. 1. Definition of Trustworthy Authentication
the concern of this paper. How to ensure that the printer will treat
the data in a trustworthy way? As pointed out by Creese et al. [3],
this type of security assurance seems to fall outside of the scope
of traditional entity authentication. Alice is able to authenticate
Bob from another company who she never meets; but does
Alice believe that Bob will treat the confidential document of
her company in a trustworthy manner if she passes it to him?
This requirement is common in the pervasive computing domain
where entities are mobile, connections are dynamic, and security
associations are transient. In this paper we define the entity
authentication accompanied by a trustworthy behaviour of the
authenticated entity as “trustworthy authentication”.
II. DEFINITION OF TRUSTWORTHY AUTHENTICATION
We unpack “trustworthy authentication” in the example above,
“a wireless printer provides trustworthy authentication to a user
who wishes to print his email on the printer”. It means two things
(see Fig. 1):
  The printer is able to authenticate itself to the user that it
is the printer the user chooses, and
  The user believes that the printer is trustworthy in following
communications.
The first part means entity authentication, but may be done in
an unconventional way. The second part is a statement of fact on
the trustworthiness of the printer – does the printer protect the
user’s data well, use the user’s data in good faith, and always
have good printing service, etc? The definition of trustworthy
authentication of entities means that an entity not only authenti-
cates him to another entity, but also assures the other entity that
he is trustworthy in the following communications.
III. A TWO-LEVEL HIERARCHICAL TRUSTWORTHY
AUTHENTICATION FOR PERVASIVE COMPUTING
A. Assumptions
Firstly we assume the availability of a well-known public
service/server which provides the basic information such as
where are the nearby printers in a similar way that a local
council service provides childcare information. We also assume
that public printers are reasonably static, i.e., not as mobile
as roaming customers, and do not change locations frequently.
Secondly we assume an existing PKI in the Internet for the use of
pervasive computing and the public keys of authorization servers
that will be introduced later are published on public servers too.
Thirdly we assume that users are happy to leave a comment on
the trustworthiness of the service at the end of their printing
job1.
Imagine roaming customer Bob gets the location information
of public printers from a public server and approaches the
one nearest to him. Bob’s PDA and the printer exchange their
public keys via a location-limited channel (e.g. Infrared) as
suggested in [1]. By direct physical contact at the location-
limited channel, Bob is sure that his PDA is communicating with
the printer he chooses – i.e., the first requirement in “trustworthy
authentication”. Next, how does the printer convince Bob that it
is trustworthy?
B. Bootstrapping
If Bob sees a brand-new printer with no trustworthiness
records, he may believe that the printer is trustworthy because
it is made by a famous printer-company such as HP, and/or
located in a Starbucks Cafe where the user considers as a safe
place, and/or both the user’s PDA and the printer are configured
using Microsoft software. This sounds like a trend towards
monoculture; however, it may be inevitable as we have to use
some trustworthiness bootstrapping. This kind of bootstrapping
based on common sense can also be used if the customer
is suspicious of the trustworthiness records presented by the
printer, since he can always retreat to this initial judgement of
trustworthiness.
C. Trustworthiness Record
If customer Alice is happy to leave a comment on the service
at the end of printing, she writes a trustworthiness record as
follows:
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where the notations are:
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: the printer’s identity registered at the local AS,
and the printer’s public key. These information is exchanged
between Alice’s PDA and the printer via the location-
limited side channel [1].
   : the comments of Alice.
1We are aware that this assumption is strong, since some users may want to
stay anonymous. But users can be authenticated as a member of group (faculty
staff) without revealing who they are - e.g. using ring signature [2].
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: the identity of a public key certification server (CS)
at Alice’s home domain.
This data is encrypted by  
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, the public key of a local
authorization server (AS). Alice gets the key from the local
notice board or tourist information center. The trustworthiness
record proper is followed by:
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a public key CS.
Alice writes the comments about the printer (which is identi-
fied by its ID and public key), notes the time when writing her
comments, and includes the identity of her certification server.
Alice then encrypts the above message by using the public key
of a local AS. This is to guarantee the confidentiality of the
message so that the printer is not able to know whether it has
good comments or bad comments from a customer. Alice also
signs the comments, and attaches a copy of her public key
certificate issued by a public key CS at her own domain. We
call (1) a trustworthiness record. It tells the local AS: “I here
put this comment ( ) about the printer (

, 
 

) at this time
( 	
). Here is my signature and you will know who
I am from the public key certificate issued by the certification
server (

).
The trustworthiness record is forwarded from the printer to the
local AS, rather than directly sent by Alice. This is because we
want to put minimized requirements on customers and it benefits
the printer to pass the trustworthiness records to the local AS
in order to obtain a trustworthiness certificate. The local AS
decrypts the first cyphertext by applying his private key and sees
the comments about the printer. The local AS also gets the ID
of the public key CS of Alice, by which it finds the CS’s public
key from its local database or somewhere else. Next, by using
the public key of CS, the local AS obtains the public key of
Alice from the public key certificate. Finally, the local AS uses
Alice’s public key to verify her signature.
D. Local Trustworthy Certificate
After the local AS receives certain number of trustworthiness
records of the printer during a certain period, it issues a trust-
worthiness certificate as:
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where  is the trustworthiness
grade given to the printer by the local AS.
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of the local AS. The use of timestamp prevents the printer from
using an old certificate of higher TWGrade since the customer
will consider it less valuable than a more recent good grade
certificate.
The trustworthiness certificate in (2) is much less complicated
than the trustworthiness record in (1). It simply says: “Here
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I, a local authorization server (
	
), give this trustwor-
thiness grade () to the printer (

) at this time
( 	
). Here is my signature.”
The printer may collect trustworthy certificates from more than
one local AS, possibly because of the maintenance needed by
local ASs or the movement of printer although we assume that
public printers do not have frequent movement.
E. Higher level Trustworthy Certificate
After a printer collects several consistently good trustwor-
thiness certificate from a local AS, the printer sends these
certificates to a higher level AS, and exchanges them for a
trustworthiness certificate signed by it:
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Here we assume that the user has obtained the public key
of the higher level AS from somewhere first. In pervasive
computing, a domain usually contains more local ASs and just
few higher level ASs. A higher AS is able to see a lot of
trustworthiness certificates issued by many local ASs; and it
applies much stricter criteria of issuing a certificate than a local
AS. Thereby a user considers a printer with such a certificate
more trustworthy than the one with just a certificate from a local
AS. The user is more likely to recognise the higher level AS,
and also obtains a more balanced view of the trustworthiness of
the printer from a higher level AS than from a single local AS.
F. Typical Procedure
Figure 2 shows a typical procedure of the proposed solution
for trustworthy authentication in pervasive computing in the
example of roaming users using a public printer.
1) Alice gets the public keys of a local AS and a higher level
AS from a local notice board.
2) Alice’s PDA and the printer exchange their public keys via
a location-limited channel, or a secret password firstly via
the location limited channel, and then the public keys via
wireless connection.
3) Alice prints her job, leaves trustworthiness record about
the printer, by wireless communication.
4) The printer forwards the comments from various customers
to the local AS.
5) The local AS issues a trustworthiness certificate to the
printer.
6) The printer may decide to forward the trustworthiness
certificates from the local AS to a higher level AS.
7) The higher level AS issues a trustworthiness certificate to
the printer.
8) The printer presents the trustworthiness certificates to a
new customer Bob.
IV. RELATED WORK, OPEN QUESTIONS & SUMMARY
Related works are in three major areas: authentication in
pervasive computing, trust establishment in pervasive computing,
and trust authentication in enterprise digital rights management
(DRM). When going to the detail of the scheme, there are
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authorization server
Higher level 
authorization server
(4)
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Fig. 2. Two-level Hierarchical Trustworthy Authentication for Pervasive
Computing
obvious questions. How does the user know that no other party
has access to his data while the email is being printed? How
does the user know that the printer itself does not save a copy
of the data for future use? And what is the threat model of the
proposed scheme?
In summary, this paper puts forward a concept of “trustworthy
authentication” in pervasive computing which is defined as entity
authentication accompanied by a trustworthy behaviour of the
authenticated entity and a two-level hierarchy of authorization
servers is proposed. The proposed scheme may be generalized
for trustworthy authentication of security devices such as firewall
and IDS. In the future, further attack analysis on the proposed
trustworthy authentication structure will be carried out. It re-
mains an open question whether one can be assured of correct
behaviour without authenticating the participants at all.
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